It has been suggested that to hold to a greater good defense (GGD) in response to the problem of evil, one must hold to a consequentialist theory of ethics. If the GGD proponent is not committed to consequentialism and is committed to an alternative ethical theory, a divine command theory, for example, then the GGD proponent is guilty of an inconsistency within his or her system of beliefs. This is a shame. The GGD is eminently plausible. So, is this right? The following is an attempt to provide a way out for the GGD proponent. Roughly I shall argue first that the GGD proponent does not have to appeal to…
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Epistemological Answers to the Logical Problem of Evil
Although I have already posted on this subject (here), I have some further thoughts. In fact, the following thoughts were an earlier attempt to respond to the logical problem of evil. The logical problem of evil is an objection to Christian theism that suggests that the Christian is somehow irrational to hold to the set of beliefs – God is good, God is all-powerful and evil exists. The set of beliefs is said to produce a contradiction. I said that, for my defense I would contend that God determines all things, including evil, while human beings, not God, remain responsible for evil. This claim rests on a view of providence commonly…
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The Logical Problem of Evil
The challenge for any theistic system, according to the logical problem of moral evil, is how one can account for the apparent contradiction produced by three propositions: God is omnipotent. God is benevolent. There is moral evil in the world. If we accept those propositions then we might be forced to say that if God could remove evil, but does not, then he cannot be good. Alternatively, we might conclude that if God is good, but does not remove evil, then he cannot be omnipotent. A logical contradiction is produced when we compare these two statements: God is either not omnipotent or not omnibenevolent. God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent Christian…