Newbigin argues that underlying the conflict between fundamentalism and liberalism is a common assumption. The assumption is derived from a distinctly modern perspective on the theory of knowledge and involves a species of Cartesian foundationalism that Newbigin believes should be challenged. Knowledge, according to Newbigin, is tradition/community constituted, grounded in personal commitment (faith). This is adequate grounds for Christian belief and is the same grounds for any kind of knowledge. Furthermore it is the best assumption for making sense of human experience. Faith is an act of obedience to a person (95). Belief, therefore, is grounded in a personal commitment to a person in his command to believe. Newbigin suggests…
-
-
Dogma, Disagreement and Doubt
If I believe p and someone who is equally rational, has access to the same evidence and spends a similar time as me looking at it believes not p, should I doubt p? This is the question of disagreement and there are two ways to respond to it. The conciliation view is that disagreement with an “epistemic peer” (someone who has approximately equal intelligence, expertise and exposure to the evidence as oneself) obliges one to lower confidence in p. The steadfast view, on the other hand, is that there is no obligation to lower one’s confidence in p. Conciliation is motivated by the thought that if someone else comes to the opposite conclusion…
-
The Dogma of Doubt
It is now mandatory to doubt. To claim to know anything with certainty is to fall foul of dogmatism, the stubborn refusal to subject beliefs to any test for truth. But is certainty the same as dogmatism? And isn’t the demand for universal doubt merely another form of dogmatism? First, to the latter point. It seems that to demand doubt is to assume a universal knowledge claim – something like: it is not possible to be certain of the truth of any belief, or, no human being can be certain of any belief, or even, no belief can produce certainty. Such claims, although different, have the added premise that no…