Many arguments for physicalism, the view that all that exists is describable in terms of physics, assume that, at some point, there will be enough convincing empirical evidence to show that folk psychology, the view that mental stuff or souls exist, is false. Let’s be clear: this would be a monumental feat and, so far, no one has come close. And, absent any empirical evidence, folk psychology carries on. So, what kind of evidence would do it? You can’t exactly show anyone that there is no mental/soulish stuff in the world. It’s no good pointing at a brain and saying, “see! There’s no soul there!” What you would need is…
-
-
Are You A Bouncy Physicalist? Take the Test and Find Out!
If you think reality is exhaustively physical, then you will probably be either a pessimist or an optimist about naturalistic scientific discovery. You will either conclude that it is highly likely that “folk psychology,” the belief that there are irreducibly mental, non-physical entities of some sort, will be shown to be false, or you will think that though it is possible that folk psychology will be proven false, it is unlikely. The latter position entails the belief that one should continue the naturalistic research program with a physicalist assumption even though you probably won’t be able to prove it. If you’re are an optimist, a bouncy physicalist, you will think…
-
Why Physicalism Fails
Laws of logic are necessary truths. The least debated law is the law of non-contradiction: statements that are contradictory cannot both be true in the same way at the same time. To say that it is a necessary truth is to say that there is no possibility that it could be false. Or, in possible world parlance, there is no possible world in which the law of non-contradiction is false. Physicalism is the view that there is no entity that is non-physical or that is not reducible to a physical entity. All physical states of affairs are contingent upon other physical states of affairs. It is possible, therefore, that everything…
-
Notes on Hempel’s Dilemma
Hempel’s dilemma purports to present an intractable problem for physicalism: (H1) If physical properties are by definition the properties expressed by the predicates of a current physical theory, physicalism is false. (H2) If physical properties are by definition the properties expressed by the predicates of an ideal physical theory, we don’t know what physicalism says. (H3) Either it is the case that physical properties are by definition the properties expressed by predicates of a current physical theory, or it is the case that the physical properties are by definition the properties expressed by predicates of an ideal physical theory. (HC) Either physicalism is false or we don’t know what it…
-
Grounding Facts About the Mental in Facts About the Physical
A physicalist wants to be able to say the following: (A) There are no mental properties. (B) S believes p. There is an apparent inconsistency in these two claims. Most physicalists consider it implausible to suggest that (B) is false and so concede that (A) is false. In order to maintain the physicalist worldview they say that mental properties are nothing over and above physical properties. This is usually stated in terms of supervenience, something like this: a set A of properties supervenes on set B of properties if for any change to A properties there is a corresponding change to B properties and in every possible world in which A properties…
-
Supervenience and the Illusive Connection Between Physical And Mental Properties.
The problem of exclusion suggests that one or other of the following theses should be abandoned: all non-physical properties depend on physical properties without being reduced to physical properties and all entities that exist are physical entities. In response to the problem many physicalists have subscribed to a form of property dualism or reductive physicalism (eliminativism). Others hold that properties that are non-physical are identical to physical properties yet remain legitimate features for analysis.[1] There are some, however, who have found promising theories that draw on finding coherent ways to analyze the structural relationship between properties. Properties, on their view, are hierarchically arranged, one depending on another, being realized by…
-
Things and Stuff and Dirt and Heaven
I have been thinking about things lately. Things that you can touch–physical objects. Most people in the world work with their hands. They make things, fry things, cut things, pick and sell things. And pretty much all people like things. We pick flowers, brew coffee, clean things, and display things so others can see them. A century ago in the west things were less important than ideas. Ideas were like magic – they changed everything, at least the way we understood everything. An idea could permeate every part of existence. A think was more valuable than a thing. Much of my own life has been focused on ideas–thoughts, imaginings, beliefs–or feelings,…
-
On the Completeness of Physics
All is Physical and Physics is All Physicalists say that all facts are fixed by physical facts. Whatever physics tells us there is – that’s it. And physics tells us that there are no non-physical things. This creates two questions: What are qualities and what are mental properties? If physicalism, of the strongest kind, is true, then qualities are identical to quantities and mental properties are identical to physical properties. On physicalism of this stripe, all effects are physical and all causes are physical. If all the effects that we can observe are physical then all the causes are physical. Empirical evidence renders non-physical causes for physical effects implausible. The measurable…