• Language,  Philosophy of Language,  Trinity,  Wittgenstein

    Language, Mind(s) and Propositions in the Trinity

    God speaks. The Bible records the first speech and God makes it. If the chronology of scripture is to be believed, God could speak prior to creation and, therefore, God can speak sans creation. He could use a language in eternity past. This seems clear: he is the first to utter a word (Gen 1); he determines the world and everything in it including all the languages, sentences, and what they mean prior to creation; and God, the Son, is identified as the “Word” that pre-exists creation (John 1). He doesn’t actually have to say anything, but he has to be able to express his thoughts in a language. On…

  • Language,  Mind,  Wittgenstein

    Could God Talk to Himself?

    Does the private language argument succeed if we apply it to God? Could God have a private language? A private mental entity (PME) is an entity only accessible by the mind that has it. A sensation, like toothache, is a good example (L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations). No one apart from the person with toothache has access to that toothache. But a thought might also count as a PME. A human thought is usually about something public, a tree perhaps, but it might be about something private like a sensation. Thoughts like these are privately owned. My thought that the Christmas tree looks good is my thought; I own it, it is had…

  • Language,  Wittgenstein

    Language

    What is the purpose of language? Where did it come from? For much of Western history we have vacillated between the theory that meaning is in the object and the theory that meaning is in the mind. Perhaps it was Wittgenstein who turned all this on its head. After making the argument for the former, Wittgenstein changed his mind and thought that the problem would be solved by resisting the temptation to define language ostensibly. Instead, language, and, more basically, meaning, is functional. Language is used in what Wittgenstein called, “language games,” a complete activity, a way of doing things not merely naming things. Language has since been top of the philosophical to-do list.…

  • Essentialism,  Wittgenstein

    Wittgensteinian Anti-Essentialism

    Ludwig Wittgenstein Essentialism suggests that a word is a sign for a meaning which correlates to an object. The way words connect with the world is by picturing a state of affairs by the use of names/signs which have determinative meanings. The object in the world has a sign. The meaning is the object in the world. The essence of the word is the meaning, the object. This, it is assumed, is known through the pointing and repeating the name of the object you are pointing to. This is an ostensive definition. To ostensibly define something is to point at something and say its name. For example, I can point at a chair, and say, “chair.” My…

  • Cornelius Van Til,  Greg Bahnsen,  Wittgenstein

    Wittgenstein and Van Til

    One wise professor once told me that to use Ludwig Wittgenstein in a paper was to invite derision. He evidently felt that Wittgenstein is so variously interpreted that one will always be wrong about what he meant. Another professor once told me that it was possible to write a paper without mentioning Cornelius Van Til. Possible, but, for this Van Tillian blogger, quite unlikely. So I offer some interaction between Van Til and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein is most commonly taken to be opposing a foundationalist theory of knowledge. He writes “Really ‘The proposition is either true or false’ only means that it must be possible to decide for or against it. But this does not say…